The Montana Constitution Article 4 Section 3 states: the Legislature SHALL insure the purity of elections and guard against the abuses of the electoral process. MCA 13-1-109 Unless specifically provided otherwise, all records pertaining to elector registration and elections are public records. They shall be open for inspection during regular office hours. Election Special Committee Public Comment submitted by Mary Beveridge December 6, 2021

#### **Election Special Committee Scope and Review**

Election Integrity isn't an issue that just materialized, it has metastasized over many years due to the fear of political optics. Since the issue now has a national focus, the citizens are finally being heard, the Montana legislative body is ready to listen. Although this request for a Special Election Committee, is limited by time and money, this is a first step in shedding light on the election issues and statutes in Montana.

This past election an executive order allowed all mail in ballots for the federal election in violation of state law MCA 13-19-104 and pre-empting the legislature's Constitutional responsibility for the administration of elections. After the Mail-In Ballot Executive Order, an infusion of money from Mark Zuckerberg (CTCL) was accepted by a majority of counties in Montana. In exchange for the money, elections divisions agreed to conduct their elections according to conditions set out by the CTCL, a training center for progressive groups and Democratic campaigns.

88.1% of the Montana over age 18 population were deemed legal voters in 2020. **EXHIBIT 1** This statistic is from the purchased 12/26/2020 Statewide Voter Registration Data and the 2020 Census. Due to the Executive Order all voters in the State Registration System were considered registered votes for the November 2020 election (ACTIVE, NON-ACTIVE, PROVISIONAL). The lack of Maintenance of the voter rolls has created bloated registrations numbers. A routine in-depth review of the state voter registration system should be in the purview of the legislature as they are constitutionally required to oversee the purity of the elections.

Citizens have paid thousands of dollars to obtain the Statewide Voter Registration records and spent countless hours researching the data. The findings point to integrity issues in the voter registration system, which is the gatekeeper to track legal voters; the foundation of the election process in Montana. These issues are not new and are cited in State audits findings dating back to 2007 (audit released in 2009) and still an issue in the August 2020 SOS Audit 19DP-06. EXHIBIT 2

The first part of the committee scope suggestion is to address Voter Registration Maintenance, statute vagueness/omissions and Zuckerberg money. In order to maximize limited resources, many of these questions may be answered by requesting information from the appropriate agencies or political subdivisions. The goal should be to develop consistent best practices. All information requested and obtained by the special election legislative committee regarding Zuckerberg grants, the Missoula review, voter registration maintenance information and correspondence to/from state agencies and political subdivisions should be provided as public information and easily accessible without charge.

#### Observations of the 12/26/2020 Montana Voter Rolls:

17,560 voter ballots were undeliverable.

1398 undeliverable ballots were previously identified as provisional or inactive,

16,163 undeliverable ballots were identified as ACTIVE-- Review the residency/address verification and transfer to inactive/removal process.

71,954 Inactive voters were sent ballots. How long do identified inactive voters stay on the voter registration system in Montana. Was any forensic follow up done on INACTIVE voters who voted?

Review all <u>2020 (eligibility dates) registered voters</u> requesting <u>(absentee) mail-in ballots</u> and having an <u>out of state</u> mailing address. Determine if they are in fact Montana residents. (DMV records, tax records, property records)

#### Statewide Voter Registration and Maintenance issues

Define ELECTION FRAUD in statute and specify consequences. Identify the protocol for election
enforcement—best practice may be to have one enforcement agency who is responsible to investigate and
prosecute irregularities. A central location should be established to collect election irregularity reports and
post for public accessibility. This will track trends and vulnerabilities.

- 2. Investigate the duplicate votes. How does this occur? Who is responsible for discovering these? This information was provided to the SOS in February 2021 and requires follow-up.
- 3. The <u>November 2020</u> election results were updated on **9/10/21** showing an increase of 1,456 from the December 26, 2020 state registration data. Why? **EXHIBIT 3**
- 4. Voter file shows 24 voter files with <u>voter eligibility dates</u> of 1801 all from Prairie County. This information was provided to the SOS in February 2021.
- 5. Eligibility dates are inconsistent from county to county. In 2013, this was brought to the legislature and other than a report verifying it occurs, it continues to be an issue. **EXHIBIT 4** 226 Voters were sent ballots before the election, which were returned, processed and accepted but have eligibility dates after the election, even into December.
- 6. Request the following actual data from the SOS for the 2021 maintenance cycle; The voters removed during the 2021 maintenance cycle, including dead voters and their date of death. The voters moved from ACTIVE to INACTIVE Status—when was the last time a vote was cast. The PROVISIONAL voters remaining on the voter rolls-date of provisional status.
- 7. Determine how the data transfer of incarcerated persons court ordered mentally incapacitated persons are communicated to the counties. (Department of Corrections and Judicial Courts)
- Determine how death record information is transmitted to the counties; is the format user friendly for the counties. DPHHS currently is charging citizens \$600 per year for death records, (public records), this is a deterrent for citizens to compare death records to the registration database
- 9. Zuckerberg CTCL grants: Require all counties to provide copies of the CTCL grant applications and the final reports to CTCL using the EXHIBIT 5 survey or similar for consistency. Were any state laws violated regarding any of the expenditures?
- 10. Acquire and review tabulation machines contracts from every county. Who has access to the State Voter Registration Database; acquire and review the contract for the new State Voter Registration System.
- 11. Survey the County Election Administrators: Do they have the highest access clearance and capability to assign user definitions for the Tabulation Machines? Do the Tabulation Machine companies or contractors have any access to the tabulating machines and under what circumstances? Are the MOUs required in statute with the MT DOJ current? (MCA 13-2-107). Are the tabulations WIFI capable?
- 12. Explore how the news media nationwide has access, in real time, to Montana election results when tabulation machines "are not connected to the internet". Are these actual counts or algorithms—how is instantaneous reporting produced? .Should the news media "call" the elections in Montana?
- 13. Revise and expand the Post-Election Audit process. EXHIBIT 6 All elections, school, municipal, tax issues should be required to have a post-election audit. Should counties that have a "possible" recount (usually a legislative district) be exempt from the post-election audit as they are currently? . EXHIBIT 7 Silver Bow County had 2 machines malfunction and brought in a new machine, due to a "possible" recount there was no audit.
- 14. Request the Ballot Inventory tracking and reconciliation system used by each county. The purpose is to develop a "best practice" procedure.
- 15. Request the registry of ballot collectors from the COPP **EXHIBIT 8** and Record of Delivery registry from the election administrators. 13-35-704 (Ballot Initiative 129 **EXHIBIT 9**) Why is this under the COPP? Is this required for all elections (municipal elections)?
- 16. Task a working committee to review laws for vagueness. Seek input from county election administrators and citizens (who have experience as election judges or election observers) on what statutes need clarity or revision and develop "best practices" procedures.
- 17. Develop and implement a forensic audit process, to be completed after all federal elections.
- 18. Review the election rules, do any of the rules need to be included as statute or eliminated.

Part two of the scope request is to allow the Missoula Voter Integrity group, without being required to sue Missoula County, to complete their review. This began as a fact-finding mission to discover weaknesses in the election statutes and became character assignation of citizens for daring to perform oversight.

In October of 2020, Missoula County was notified a citizen's group would be reviewing the 2020 election. Notice the date, this was before the results of November 2020 were known. The video recording of the election process which Missoula County stated existed was also requested, but never produced as it was eventually destroyed.

MCA <u>13-1-109</u> states: <u>Unless specifically provided otherwise</u>, all records pertaining to elector registration and elections are public records. They shall be open for inspection during regular office hours.

There is always catch with public records; <u>the cost</u>, these citizens PAID thousands of dollars to conduct the review. The only election records they were allowed to view were the mail-in ballot signature envelopes. They discovered 4000+ less envelopes than the reported ballot returns indicated—this was an all-mail in election, every ballot should have had an envelope.

#### Allow the Completion of the Missoula County Election Review

- 1. Obtain the copies of the envelopes with what appears to be the same signature, all from the same facility. Determine if further investigation is required.
- 2. Determine which voters did not have signature envelopes.
- 3. Inspection of the November 2020 election absentee ballots applications, all Pre-filled absentee applications, and rejected absentee applications. Verify the signatures as compared to <u>original registration</u> signatures. If there is a secondary signature, determine if there is a difference. These should be preserved for further investigation. This allows for signature audits in a smaller sample. Citizens volunteers.
- 4. Compare the "inactive" accepted ballots, for signature verification compared to original registration signature. determine if there is a difference. These should be preserved for further investigation. This allows for signature audits in a smaller sample. Citizen Volunteers.
- 5. Missoula County is to provide the ballot reconciliation documentation. Number ordered, purchased, voided, mailed out, remaining, etc. Missoula County also had a ballot printing machine, provide the tracking of the ballots from this printer and the explanation for why this was used.
- 6. To keep within the monetary and finite scope of the committee, these reviews may require additional legislative oversight and should be viewed as a starting point not an ending point.

Many citizens have worked on election integrity for years and are a resource. Citizens have a vested interest as they live with the outcomes of elections. After reviewing the scope outcomes, the committee should decide if a special session is required to address necessary election integrity legislation.

# Voter Registration

Population Under 18 Eligible Voters*	1,084,225 ( <u>232,024)</u> 852, 201	A PEOPLE		
2020 Registered Voters 751,082*72,481 Inactive and Provisional Voters were considered Registered voters for 2020.	751,082* visional Voters were oters for 2020.			
oo 170' of all adults in MT are registered to	T are registered to	O Population estimates base, April 1, 2010, (72019)		<b>1</b>
vote.	וו פוב ובפוסובובת וח	O Population, percent change - April 1, 2010 (extensins base) to July 1, 2019, (12019)		86
* Opical Color Position	COST	<b>O</b> Population, Census, April 1, 2028	V	TRAIR
mentally incapacitated individuals or non-	ndividuals or non-	O Population, Census, April 1, 2010		SIP 086
citizens are taken into account, which would	ccount, which would			
שני בפשר הוב להיביות		O Persons under 5 years, person		E59
*Voters with Eligibility Dates After 11/3/2020	Dates After 11/3/2020	Persons under 18 years, percent	232024 Under 18	<b>6</b> 23.8
voted and were counted now the voter rolls	פח ווסא פרנתומוב מוב	O Persons 66 years and over, percent		A 19.3%
*Registered voter numbers from SOS list purchased 12/26/2020.	ist purchased 12/26/2020.	<b>G</b> Fanale parsons, percent		A 40.74

https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/MT



INFORMATION SYSTEMS AUDIT

19DP-06

REPORT SUMMARY AUGUST 2020

MONTANA LEGISLATIVE AUDIT DIVISION

#### Security and Maintenance of Montana Election Systems

THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

#### BACKGROUND

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#### Agency:

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#### Secretary of State:

Cogn Statistics

#### Division:

Flexions

This information systems audit examined whether SOS is evaluating physical security and managing election risks, including the accuracy of the voter registration database. We found that, although SOS is making improvements to elections, further definitions are required to identify scope of election security and election security measurements. SOS can also improve success of future security initiatives by updating grant management practices, with potential oversight opportunities from the legislature. SOS provides counties the tools to manage the accuracy of voter registration and status changes, but our work found that SOS is not conducting state-level maintenance procedures where it is most efficient. These are needed to ensure changes are made in a timely manner and to identify potential training, system, or process improvements.

#### **KEY FINDINGS:**

Statute and rule do not define the scope of election security or align with best practices. Due to the decentralized management of elections, counties need a consistent definition of security and a formal security assessment process. Current law lacks clarification of election security and rule does not specify security measures.

Management of federal grants do not align with best practices. SOS does not have performance measurements in place as outlined in grant management best practices. SOS does not have any controls in place to ensure federal grant funding is being used to meet objectives and goals of the grant.

SOS does not have an Information Security Manager position to oversee all divisions within the department. Since 2017, SOS has had a vacant Information Security Manager position that is necessary to independently oversee all aspects of security within an agency, including election security.

The department does not have a state-level maintenance program in place to ensure accuracy and timeliness of voter registration statuses. SOS relies on the county election administrators to update their residents voter status. Although SOS provides the resources and information, they are not verifying that status updates have occurred within a timely manner.

For the full report of more information, contact (b). Leasthaw Vain Decision.

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#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

In this report, we issued the following recommendations:

To the office: 4 To the legislature: 1

#### RECOMMENDATION #1 (PAGE 10):

Using industry standards and best practices, the Montana Legislature should define the scope of election security and mandate assessments at the local levels.

Office response: Concur

#### RECOMMENDATION #2 (PAGE 12):

SOS should align the definition of election security within rule with statute and provide further guidance on necessary security measurements.

Office response: Concur

#### RECOMMENDATION #3 (PAGE 16):

SOS should enhance the grant management program, including implementing measurable objectives, goals, and timelines while ensuring ongoing evaluation is occurring to measure success.

Office response: Concur

#### RECOMMENDATION #4 (PAGE 21):


SOS should fill the vacant Information Security Manager position to ensure both election security and agency-wide security have consistent, independent, and comprehensive oversight.

Office response: Concur

#### RECOMMENDATION #5 (PAGE 30):

SOS should implement between a state-level maintenance program to address timeliness and verification of voter status updates in the voter registration database.

Office response: Concur



#### LEGISLATIVE AUDIT DIVISION

Tori Hunthausen, Legislative Auditor Deborah F. Butler, Legal Counsel



Deputy Legislative Auditors: Cindy Jorgenson Angus Maciver

#### MEMORANDUM

To:

Tori Hunthausen, Legislative Auditor

FROM:

Torry van Slyke, Performance Auditor ( \( \subseteq \subseteq \)

DATE:

January 23, 2013

SUBJECT:

2012 General Election Voter Registration, Legislative Request 13L-3651

The following summarizes information relating to the number of registered voters and the number of votes cast in the 2012 general election. To compile this information, we compared the Secretary of State's (SOS) official number of registered voters for the 2012 general election to the number of registration records in the Statewide Voter Registration System (SVRS).

SOS staff provided us with the official number of Montana voters registered for the 2012 general election, which comes from the official results counties submit to SOS during the post-election statewide canvass (See attached document.) The left column of data ("2012 general registered voters") is the official number of Montana residents, by county, eligible to vote in the 2012 general election.

We then obtained the actual database records of all Montana registered voters from the SVRS system, as of January 18, 2012. Each record (i.e., registered Montana voter) in the system includes a date the record was last modified. We compared the total number of records whose last modified date was on or before November 6, 2012 (Election Day) to the official number of registered voters, and found these two numbers of total registered voters differed by 0.02 percent.

According to SOS staff, discrepancies in numbers could be due to how counties manage their workflows. Voter registrations are often performed on written cards, and some counties may choose to enter voter registration information in SVRS after polls have closed, yielding a modified date in SVRS that may be different from when the voter actually registered. Additionally, the database records we reviewed also reflect changes in registration records made since Election Day.

The enclosed registration and voting data provided by SOS for the 2012 General Election appears to be accurate and reliable, based on review of the available SVRS registration records. As shown, there were no examples in which votes counted exceeded the number of registered voters in a county.

5 Vidmid Cerrespondence LegReq (31.11, 305) -trs-Kary-memo docaldis

Enclosure

## Election Grant Application and Funding Open Record Request Statutory Declaration

Elected	Official overseeing elections:
Election	Administrator:
Work A	ddress:
County	State <u>Montana</u>
Did you	or county accept any funding from the Center for Tech and Civic Life or any other private
or non-	profit grants or monies during the 2020 election cycle or prior years.
Yes	_ If yes for 2020, complete the affidavit.
Were g	rants accepted in prior years? Yes No If Yes, what years?
No	If no, or grants were only accepted in prior years, sign and date the last page of the
declara	tion and return it to
	lowing information is requested only for the 2020 election cycle if non-profit or private were accepted:
1.	A. Provide the legal authority for accepting non-profit or private grants or monies for
	elections.
	B. Provide the <u>vetting process</u> to determine if the grant source was partisan.
	C. Provide the results of the vetting process of the grant source.
2.	Who in your county authorized the acceptance of the grants? List all
	Name Title
	Who in your county signed the grant application? List All
	Name Title
	Name Title

3. Provide a copy of the grant award(s) documents (grant sited above) for the 2020 Election Cycle 4. Provide the reconciliation of the grant expenditures. Screenshots from the county accounting system tracking and/or the grant reconciliation may be submitted. Identify any items purchased; Included a complete description and receipts of item(s), all computer equipment, vehicles, drop boxes, etc any tangible item. Include the cost of each item, the vendor and any purchasing documents, ie title, computer registrations, etc 6. Identify any state agency, political subdivisions, organizations, or group which was a recipient of your county's grant(s) monies and the amounts received. 7. Did the grantor request reconciliation documents? Yes \_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_ Provide the grantor documentation, stipulating no reconciliation was required. If it is stipulated in Grant Award document provided the reconciliation documents. 8. Did your county have any unspent grant money? No \_\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_\_ Amount Remaining \_\_\_\_\_ Disposition of any unspent grant money. 9. Provide the public disclosures documentation such as press releases of the grant award disclosing the origin, political affiliation of the grants and parameters of use prior to the election. If there was no public disclosure, explain why not?. 10. Did your county in any way participate in or facilitate in providing access or transmitting any data for use of a vote/ballot tracking app? If yes provide all correspondence regarding the app. Include the name and organization of the app creator/requestor. 11. Was your county contacted to provide or transmit information for a voter/ballot

tracking app? If yes, proved all correspondence and documentation.





# 2020 Federal General Post Election Audit: List of Counties, Precincts, and Offices Chosen Montana Secretary of State sosmt.gov • soselections@mt.gov

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	County	Office	State Office	Ballot Issue	<b>3</b>	ic 2	n n	nitial	Additional Augres orly i maceographe precinitisi	30 3 4 5	3 1 1
1	Beaverhead	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	5036	PREC_04				PREC OF	PREC 21
			Superintendent of Public Instruction		5021	17					26
_		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	HD32	Prec_10					Prec_09
-		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	N/A	Prec_13			PREC 1		PREC_12
_		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	HDS8	003					011
-		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	H <b>03</b> 7	PREC_1					PREC_14
7		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	HD22		P228				PZIA
8		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	N/A	Pct_09			Pct_03		Pct_07
		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	HD37	13-37					11-37
-		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	IR-130	SO18	PREC_3			PREC 1		PREC 5
_		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	HD78	PC 478W			PC 377W		PC-577S
-		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	N/A	PREC_18			MEC 2	PREC 4	PREC 14
_		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	UR-130	H013	PREC 26	PREC 43	PREC 44	PHE 12	PAC 37	PREC SO
<b></b>		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	HD63	638	64A		63	64C	586
-		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	NA	PCT 10			PCT 01		PCT 13
_		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	UR-130	H077	PREC_2			PREC 1		PREC 10
		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	UR-130	HO 28	PREC_13			PREC_DI	PREC 18	PREC 21
_	Jefferson	N/A	M/V	N/A	N/A	N/A			N/A ( See		N/A
	Judith Basin	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	UR-130	HO30	PREC_2			PREC 1	PREC.)	PREC 4
-	Lake	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	HD10		PAB 2		POLI.	POL5	POL 6
		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	UR-130	5040	P10	P14		P02		P18
-	1	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	N/A	2 PREC	7 47		1 PREC		4 PREC
•		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	UR-130	H001	13 PREC	<del> </del>		6 PREC		10 PREC
		U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	UR-130	S036	15/1_PREC			the state of the same of the same	7 PREC	15/2 PREC
-	Mineral	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	5007	25_PREC			22 PREC	26 MEC	30 PREC
-	Missoula	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	H090	CHIEF90	CUN92	EVARO94	LOWES		RUSS995
-	Musselshell	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	HD40	PREC_8	CONTOC	CTIPACION	PREC.3		PREC 7
_	Park	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	UR-130	H059	59A NPC			S90 SPC		FOGL SW
-	Petroleum	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	N/A	PREC_1			337315	New years of	4999.314
		-	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	N/A	PCT 11N			PCT 115		1 a 4
-	Phillips Condens	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	HD17	Prec_19			Proc. 24	Prec 29	Prec_34
-	Pondera	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	5039	P_5.78	<del> </del>		P 6.78		P_11.80
	Powell	U.S Rep		LR-130	SD44		24_PCT	<del>                                     </del>	07_PCT	12_ACT	23_PCT
_	Ravalli	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction			21_907	I FOLL	<del> </del>		07	12
-	Richland	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	SD18	09 10-34	<del> </del>	<del> </del>	02 15-31	18-31	28-34
	Roosevelt	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	N/A	PREC_21	<del> </del>	<del></del>	PREC 3	PREC 6	PREC 17
-	Rosebud	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	UR-130	N/A S007		<del> </del>	<del> </del>	ri	#22	#6 IF
_	Sanders	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130		87 4_PREC	<del> </del>	<del>                                     </del>	3_PREC		6 PREC
-	Sheridan	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	N/A	N/A	NA	N/A	W/A		N/A
	Silver Bow	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		INA	TALO.	PREC_1	PREC_7	PREC_11
	Stillwater	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	IR-130	N/A MOEG	PREC_13	<del>}</del>	<del>                                     </del>		PREC_4	PREC 5
-	Sweet Grass	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	UR-130	H059	PREC_3	<del> </del>	<del> </del>	PREC_1		
_	Teton	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	HD17	PREC_1	<del> </del>	<del> </del>	PREC_6	PREC_7	PREC_17
-	Toole	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	UR-130	N/A	SHEL-R	<b></b>	<del> </del>	KEYM	SHE-CTY	SUNBAST
<b>—</b>	Valley	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	N/A	34	<b></b>	<u> </u>	31	33	
4	Wibaux	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	5018	11	<u> </u>		<u> </u>		70.4
4	Yellowstone	U.S Rep	Superintendent of Public Instruction	LR-130	HD43	43.3	44.1	51.1	39.2	40.4	43.1

\*Jefferson County and Silver Bow County are exempt from the Post-Election Audit due to a possible recount in SD 38



### 2020 Federal General Post Election Audit Results: Montana Secretary of State sosmt.gov • soselections@mt.gov

		Schotted Procupet to	
	for caty	Acett	Bases II
1	Beaverhead	PREC 04	No unexplained differences
2	Big Horn	17	No unexplained differences
3	Blaine	Prec_10	No unexplained differences
4	Broadwater	Prec_13	No unexplained differences
5	Carbon	003	No unexplained differences
6	Carter	PREC 1	No unexplained differences
12	Cascade	P1982	No unexplained differences
		P228	No unexplained differences
8		Pct_09	No unexplained differences
	Custer	13.37	No unexplained differences
	Dawson	PREC 3	No unexplained differences
	Deer Lodge	PC_478W	No unexplained differences
	Fergus	PREC_18	No unexplained differences
13	Flathead	PREC 26 PREC 43	No unexplained differences
			No unexplained differences
	Calladia	PREC 44	No unexplained differences
	Galiatin	638 64A	No unexplained differences
15	Clasian	PCT 10	No unexplained differences
	Glacier Granite	PREC_2	No unexplained differences  No unexplained differences
	Hill	PREC 13	No unexplained differences
_	Jefferson *	N/A	N/A
-	Judith Basin	PREC_2	No unexplained differences
_	take	BEA 1	No unexplained differences
<del>  "</del>		PAB 2	No unexplained differences
71	Lewis & Clark	P10	No unexplained differences
┢		P14	No unexplained differences
72	Liberty	2 PREC	No unexplained differences
	Lincoln	13_PREC	No unexplained differences
	Madison	15/1 PREC	No unexplained differences
-	Mineral	25 PREC	No unexplained differences
26	Missoula	CHIEF90	No unexplained differences
		CLIN92	No unexplained differences
		EVARO94	No unexplained differences
27	Musseishell	PREC_8	No unexplained differences
218	Park	S9A NPC	No unexplained differences
29	Petroleum	PREC_1	No unexplained differences
30	Phillips	PCT 11N	No unexplained differences
31	Pondera	Prec 19	No unexplained differences
-	Powell	P 5.78	No unexplained differences
33	Ravelli	21_PCT	No unexplained differences
		24_PCT	No unexplained differences
	Richland	09	No unexplained differences
-	Roosevelt	10-34	No unexplained differences
	Rosebud	PREC_21	No unexplained differences
-	Sanders	87	No unexplained differences
	Sheridan	4_PREC	No unexplained differences
39	Silver Bow *	N/A	N/A
<b> </b>		N/A	N/A
<u></u>		N/A	N/A
-	Stillwater	PREC_13	No unexplained differences
	Sweet Grass	PREC_3	No unexplained differences
	Teton	PREC_1	No unexplained differences
-	Toole	SHEL-R	No unexplained differences
	Valley	34	No unexplained differences
	Wibaux	1	No unexplained differences
46	Yellowstone	43.3	No unexplained differences
		44.1	No unexplained differences
	<u> </u>	51.1	No unexplained differences
	Mar. Manual and P. St. and		

<sup>\*</sup>Sefferson and Silver Bow Counties are exempt from the Post-Election Audit due to a possible recount in SD 38

https://www.montanarightnow.com/tncms/asset/editorial/62d68c06-1e38-11eb-9665-3b04561803fe/

#### Ballot machines go down in Butte-Silver Bow County

Megan Lewis KFBB/KHBB News Director Nov 3, 2020

Secretary of State Corey Stapleton has told Montana Right Now, two ballot machines have 'gone down' in Butte-Silver Bow County. It has slowed the counting process down.

Stapleton told our reporter at the Capitol Building, a new machine is on it's way and things should be back to normal soon.

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#### OFFICE OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION STATE OF MONTANA





March 20, 2019

**TO: School District Clerks, Election Administrators** 

FROM: Nicole Thuotte, School Finance Specialist

**RE**: Notice of important changes in mail and absentee ballot collection requirements pursuant to the Montana Ballot Interference Prevention Act

Important changes in mail and absentee ballot collection requirements are effective for the May 7, 2019 election and continue into future elections. This information is meant to give further details about the guidance issued by the Montana Secretary of State's office, relating to elections run by school district officials.

#### **New Requirements**

Ballot initiative LR 129 was passed in the November 2018 general election. Now codified in §§ 13-35-701 through 705, MCA and known by the short title "Montana Ballot Interference Prevention Act", the law limits the return of ballots by an individual other than the voter. To return a ballot for another person, an individual must meet one of the following relationship definitions:

- Acquaintance: An individual known by the voter;
- <u>Caregiver</u>: An individual who provides medical or health care assistance to the
  voter in a residence, nursing care institution, hospice facility, assisted living
  center, assisted living home, residential care institution, adult day health care
  facility, or adult foster care home;
- <u>Family Member</u>: An individual who is related by blood, marriage, adoption or legal guardianship;
- <u>Household Member</u>: An individual who resides at the same residence as the voter.

An individual meeting these requirements is allowed to return no more than <u>6 (six)</u> <u>ballots</u> per election. For each ballot returned, the ballot collector (individual returning the ballot) must sign a register, using the registry prescribed by the Secretary of State's office. This registry must be filed by election, then by the ballot collector's last name. If the ballot collector returns other ballots for the same election, a new registry is signed and filed alphabetically with the other(s).

Additionally, all registry forms must be emailed to the Office of the Commissioner of Political Practices each week, in compressed PDF format, at <a href="mailto:comballot@mt.gov">comballot@mt.gov</a>.

#### Office of Public Instruction (OPI) Recommendations

The following are suggestions for implementation of the above requirements. Districts may choose other implementation methods that meet the requirements of the law:

- Ballot boxes should NEVER be left unattended. All ballot boxes should be clearly marked with a notice regarding ballot collection. The OPI has developed a notice for districts to use.
- Anyone in the district who will be responsible for collecting ballots, including
  those who are manning deposit boxes, should be deputized as election officials.
  Anyone not deputized as an election official and who accepts ballot on behalf of
  an individual, becomes a ballot collector.
- It is highly recommended that the district logs all ballots received, and identify
  how each ballot is received (e.g., add a column to the voter list for "method of
  return" and use "E" for returned by elector, "M" for returned by mail, and "C"
  for collected by another individual).
- Ask each individual returning a ballot whose ballot they are returning. If the ballot is not theirs they are required to sign the registry.
- If an individual returning a ballot refuses to sign the registry, or does not meet
  one the acceptable relationships, accept the ballot and report the violation to
  the MT Commissioner of Political Practices. If you do not have the individual's
  name, record as much information as possible (height, weight, hair color, vehicle
  information, etc.)
- Let other district employees know about the new ballot collection requirements.
   If anyone accepts a ballot from someone with whom they do not have an acceptable relationship, they are in violation of the law, and must be reported to the MT Commissioner of Political Practices.
- It is recommended that the district post notices of the new requirements on all ballot boxes, in areas where ballot boxes are located, and in all pollinglocations.

#### Link to Forms:

**Ballot Collection Registry Form:** 

https://sosmt.gov/Portals/142/Elections/Documents/2019-BallotCollectionRegistry1.pdf

**Ballot Interference Prevention Act Complaint Form:** 

https://politicalpractices.mt.gov/Portals/144/2019%20Communication%20assets/PDFs %20for%20website/Fillable%20Ballot%20Interference%20Prevention%20Act%20Compl aint%20Form.pdf?ver=2019-03-12-152127-720

State Administration and Veterans Affairs
Zoom Remote Meeting
February 27, 2020
OPI LR 129 Guidance
Exhibit 24

#### **BALLOT LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATIVE REFERENDUM NO. 129 (LR-129)**

#### **LEGISLATIVE REFERENDUM NO. 129**

#### AN ACT REFERRED BY THE LEGISLATURE

AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE MONTANA BALLOT INTERFERENCE PREVENTION ACT; PROHIBITING THE COLLECTION OF ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL'S BALLOT; PROVIDING EXCEPTIONS; REQUIRING CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE AUTHORIZED TO COLLECT BALLOTS TO PROVIDE CERTAIN INFORMATION WHEN DELIVERING THE BALLOT TO A POLLING PLACE OR ELECTION ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE; PROVIDING PENALTIES AND DEFINITIONS; PROVIDING THAT THE PROPOSED ACT BE SUBMITTED TO THE QUALIFIED ELECTORS OF MONTANA; AND PROVIDING AN IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVE DATE.

The 2017 Legislature has submitted this proposal for a vote. LR-129 prohibits a person from collecting another voter's ballot, with certain exceptions. The prohibition would not apply to an election official, postal worker, caregiver, family member, household member, or an acquaintance. Any such individuals that are caregivers, family members, household members or acquaintances would be required to sign a registry at the polling place or the election administrator's office when delivering the ballot and are required to provide the following information: the individual's name, address, and phone number; the voter's name and address; and the individual's relationship to the voter. An individual who violates any provision within LR-129 could be fined \$500 for each ballot unlawfully collected.

- [] YES on Legislative Referendum LR-129
- NO on Legislative Referendum LR-129